The Polish crisis of the early 1980s was preceded by unrest that broke out repeatedly during the 1970s in Poland, associated with mass strikes of Polish workers (1970, 1976). Each time they were provoked by the announcement by the government of the Polish People's Republic of a sharp increase in prices for some consumer goods.
Martial law in Poland (December 13, 1981 – July 22, 1983; Polish: Stan wojenny w Polsce 1981-1983) became a period of dictatorship, which was declared by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who fought the opposition represented by the right-wing trade union organization Solidarity.
Assessments of the events of that era vary greatly both within Poland itself and beyond its borders. During martial law, repressions took place in the country. But in general, the scale of repression, as well as the reaction of the opposition itself during this period, was moderate and even somewhat muted, given the brewing consumer crisis in the country. The Catholic Church of Poland played a key role in preventing the escalation of the conflict on both sides.
Pro-Western unrest in the Polish trade union environment began to be felt more and more acutely, especially in the context of the impending consumer crisis. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time 1st Secretary of the PUWP, head of government and minister of defense, understood that the main destabilizing threat came from the Solidarity organization (since 1980), which enjoyed the support of the population. On the morning of December 12, 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski called the leadership of the USSR and said the following: “... on the night of December 12-13 of this year. Martial law will be introduced throughout the entire territory of the People's Republic of Poland. I place full responsibility for this step on myself...”
On the night of December 12–13, 1981, telephone communications were cut off throughout Poland. As a result, the leaders of the opposition anti-communist movement Solidarity instantly found themselves isolated. Tanks and armored personnel carriers appeared on the streets. A statement by General Wojciech Jaruzelski was broadcast on television that “the hands of the adventurers must be tied before they push the Fatherland into the abyss of a fratricidal war.” The general also announced the creation of the Military Council of National Salvation.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski himself often pointed out that declaring martial law in the country was “the lesser of two evils,” since otherwise the country was threatened by the entry of Soviet troops.
As a result of this action, the local trade union committees of Solidarity were significantly weakened, and many leaders were intimidated. But in general, Solidarity continued to operate under the leadership of Lech Walesa, who for a time chose a policy of non-resistance, well known to the Poles since the partition of the country. A striking manifestation of the ongoing underground activity even at this time was the systematic publication of periodicals, leaflets and bulletins. The publishers were secretly supported by the Catholic Church, which maintained a strong position in Polish society.
On July 17, 1986, the Polish government adopted an amnesty law; in the period until February 21, 1987, 1,200 participants in anti-government protests took advantage of it (of which more than 200 were serving sentences in prison).
Immediately after the introduction of martial law, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR. The following year, 1982, Poland, after the introduction of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, was deprived of its most favored nation status in trade, and its application to join the International Monetary Fund was blocked. The 1984 amnesty, however, opened the door to the normalization of economic relations between the two countries. On February 20, 1987, US President R. Reagan announced the lifting of remaining sanctions and the restoration of normal trade.
Federal Agency for Education
State educational institution of higher professional education
Department of National History
USSR and the Polish crisis of 1980-1981.
Samara 2011
Introduction
Chapter 1. Polish crisis of 1980-1981.
Chapter 2. The attitude of the USSR to the Polish events of 1980-1981.
Conclusion
List of used literature
Introduction
“Our homeland is over the abyss. The achievements of many generations and the house rebuilt from the ashes are turning into ruins. Government structures cease to function. The fading economy is being dealt new blows every day. Living conditions place a heavy burden on people's shoulders. Through every enterprise, through many Polish families, there are lines of painful division. The atmosphere of incessant conflicts, misunderstandings, and hatred brings psychological devastation. Strikes, strike readiness, protests have become the norm..."
These words were spoken on Warsaw radio on the morning of December 13, 1981 by the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland, General W. Jaruzelski, in his address to the Polish people in connection with the introduction of martial law in the country.
It became necessary due to the growing crisis in Polish society by the beginning of the 1980s. Due to unresolved problems in the economic life of Poland, a mass labor movement began, which, along with economic demands, began to put forward political ones. An independent self-governing trade union "Solidarity" was formed.
Socialism in Poland was established in 1945 following the defeat of Nazi Germany. Taking advantage of the presence of the Soviet Army, leftist parties took power and began to introduce the principles of a socialist economy and a Soviet-style political system. The Soviet leadership proclaimed the principles of strengthening fraternal friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, as well as the indisputable right to independent development. In reality, this rhetoric did not work: the leadership of the USSR tried to maintain a paternalistic system of relations with other socialist countries by any means, including the direct use of force.
As a result, the position of the USSR in relation to the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 is interesting. This work will be devoted to consideration of this issue.
To achieve this goal, we set the following tasks:
Consider the events in Poland in 1980-1981.
Analyze the change in the USSR's attitude towards the Polish crisis.
The chronological framework of the work is spelled out in the title of the topic. To be more specific, this is: the summer of 1980, when strikes began in Polish factories and enterprises, to December 1981, when martial law was introduced.
When writing the first chapter, the following scientific works were used:
) Loiko L.V. Strength test: Pol.-Soviet island. friendship: formation, development.
) Tymovsky M., Kenevich J., Holzer E. History of Poland.
The first book is notable for the fact that the author, using rich factual material, recreates in detail the picture of the events taking place in Poland in the 1980s. The big disadvantage is the subjective interpretation of these events, since the main motive of the work is to show the history of Poland in the context of strengthening the friendship of the Soviet and Polish peoples (the author introduces us to the activities of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society).
The second work, in our opinion, is more objective. Famous Polish historians have outlined the history of Poland from the 10th century to the present day. It is interesting to us because it describes in detail the crisis of 1980-1981. The authors were able to overcome stereotypes and took a step in building qualitatively new Polish-Russian relations, based on deep knowledge and feelings of mutual respect.
When writing a chapter on the USSR’s attitude to the crisis of 1980-1981. The following works were used:
Immersion in the quagmire: (Anatomy of stagnation) / Comp. and general ed. T.A. Notkina.
This work examines precisely the position of the Soviet leadership regarding the Polish events.
Lavrenov S.Ya. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts / S.Ya. Lavrenov, I.M. Popov.
The reference book “Poland. Questions and answers". The emphasis there is mainly on the economic and spiritual spheres of life in Polish society. In the article by Losoto O. and Tretyakov M. “Lech Walesa. Political Portrait" (Echo of the Planet, 1989. No. 22), citing interesting facts from the biography of this prominent political figure, the authors try to answer the question: why exactly L. Walesa headed the trade union association "Solidarity".
Chapter 1. Polish crisis of 1980-1981.
External and internal difficulties forced the Polish government in the summer of 1980 to carry out a long-overdue increase in prices for meat and other food products. It was well known from the experience of previous years how painfully the Polish public reacted to sudden price increases. It was precisely such government acts that were the formal pretext for the explosion of discontent among labor collectives in 1970 and 1976. However, the new price increase, carried out on July 1, 1980, was carried out using old methods, without first preparing public opinion. On the same day, the first strikes took place at the Ursus factories in Warsaw and the Autosan factories in Sanok. Unrest began at other enterprises.
At first, the demands were put forward mainly economic: the abolition of price increases or compensation for price increases in wages. In most cases, the authorities satisfied the claims of labor collectives, but increasing wages at some enterprises caused a chain reaction, and strikes began at others. Soon, the amounts allocated by the government to increase staff salaries far exceeded the budget savings that were expected to be obtained by raising food prices.
The lack of a clear concept of overcoming economic difficulties, the reluctance of the party and state leadership to enter into an open and honest dialogue with the working class, commitment to bureaucratic methods of management, fear of any change - all this did not allow the government to successfully resolve the social conflict. The socio-political situation in Poland that emerged in July - the first half of August 1980 was extremely favorable for anti-government activities.
And the previously created propaganda and organizational potential of the political opposition began to work. Already in July, strikes at Lublin enterprises followed a clearly developed plan and increasingly acquired a political character.
On the night of August 16-17 at the shipyard named after. Lenin, the Interfactory Strike Committee was created, which came out with unprecedented criticism of the Polish authorities. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, E. Gierek, appeared on television and admitted mistakes in socio-economic policy, promised reforms and called on the strikers to return to work. His performance did not have the expected effect.
Having created the Interplant Strike Committee at the Gdansk shipyard, the Korovians took control of events into their own hands. In order to realize their long-conceived plans for the formation of a legal opposition organization, members of the KOR instilled in dissatisfied workers the idea of the need to establish new trade unions, “independent and self-governing”, which could become a “guarantor” of their rights. In the socio-economic sphere, Korov’s advisers imposed the most demagogic, unrealistic demands on the workers. At the same time, of course, what was meant was not the interests of the working class, but the further aggravation of the situation in the country.
After the signing of an agreement between the government commission and the strike committee in Gdansk on August 31, 1980, the ideological and political struggle in Poland worsened. A new structure arose in the political system of the state: “independent and self-governing” trade unions “Solidarity”.
The right to lead the strike in Gdansk, and subsequently Solidarity, was given to 37-year-old electrician Lech Walesa. He was born into a poor peasant family, where in addition to him there were 6 more children. Walesa's parents died early. He attended school, an agricultural college, served in the army and went to work as an electrician at the shipyard. V.I. Lenin in Gdansk. Soon Lech got married; Now he and his wife Danuta have 8 children. Like most Poles, Walesa is a very religious person. At his insistence, every Solidarity meeting begins with a divine service. When the strike movement swept the country on August 14, 1980, Lech Walesa jumped over the fence surrounding the Gdansk shipyard and joined the strikers.
The rapid quantitative growth of Solidarity is noteworthy: during September 1980 - February 1981, 7-8 million people joined its ranks. Apparently, two factors had an impact: deep unrest among the Polish working people, the urgent need for changes in social policy, and on the other hand, the long-term preparatory work of the political opposition. In all this, one could also feel a certain emotional impulse of millions of Poles who believed the slogans and promises of the leaders of Solidarity and supported them with the same enthusiasm with which they supported E. Gierek’s call to “build a second Poland” in the early 70s.
Using Solidarity as its legal cover, the anti-socialist opposition waged a fierce struggle against the leading role of the PUWP in society, the socialist system and Polish-Soviet friendship. With the help of political and economic demands, organizing strikes and poster wars, she sought to disorganize the work of the state apparatus, undermine the legal, moral and political foundations of society, cause economic chaos in the country and aggravate the material difficulties of the population.
Solidarity organized strikes almost daily in a staggered pattern across all provinces of the country. In January 1981, for example, work breaks were provoked at almost 2 thousand enterprises, and 1.7 million people were thus drawn into labor and socio-political conflicts.
The increase in wages for workers and office workers, carried out under pressure from Solidarity, with a simultaneous drop in labor productivity and a reduction in working hours, caused progressive inflation. From September to December 1980, average wages increased by 12 percent, while average monthly industrial output fell. In May 1981, the decline in industrial production already exceeded 18 percent, and wages increased by almost a quarter compared to May of the previous year. Every day, up to one and a half billion zlotys were paid from the wage funds of enterprises and institutions, which had no commodity equivalent on the domestic market.
The leadership of the PUWP and government bodies that set a course for the renewal of the country were placed in extremely difficult conditions. It was practically impossible to carry out rehabilitation under strike pressure, in conditions of “a gun to your head.” The opposition accused the authorities of helplessness in matters of economic management and unwillingness to respect the interests of workers.
The PUWP faced internal difficulties. Many party members joined Solidarity; in some centers, so-called “horizontal structures” arose, uniting party organizations that advocated reforms. On the other hand, the states of the communist bloc put pressure on the Polish leaders, insisting on more vigorous action against Solidarity. On December 5, a meeting of the heads of these states took place, which was preceded by a concentration of troops near the borders of Poland. However, Moscow feared the possible consequences of an armed invasion of Poland and postponed making a final decision.
At the end of 1980 - beginning of 1981, Solidarity leaders increasingly felt confident in their abilities. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered for demonstrations, and strikes and protests took place in some regions against abuses and violations of the law by local authorities. Following the example of the workers, peasants organized a protest in Rzeszow, and students in August 1981 in Lodz and a number of other cities organized “hunger marches” under the slogan “The government seeks to starve the people.” The opposition to the communist system was grouped around Solidarity, which was formally just a trade union.
February 1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski was appointed prime minister. The prime minister in uniform was supposed to symbolize determination and firmness. The editor of the newspaper Politika, Mieczysław Rakovski, who was considered a party liberal, became deputy prime minister. The government promised to carry out economic reform - limiting centralization in economic management and introducing elements of economic accounting, and also agreed to the creation of an organizing committee of the Independent Union of Farmers and the registration of the Independent Students' Association.
In the spring and summer of 1981, the communist authorities and Solidarity were in a state of unstable equilibrium. In early March, after the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet leadership met with the Polish delegation in Moscow and demanded the introduction of martial law. Over the following weeks, the authorities began to tighten their policies, and on March 19, during the Warsaw Pact military exercises that began in Poland, police beat several Solidarity activists in the city of Bydgoszcz. The union threatened a general strike, but its leaders tried to prevent it, fearing outside interference. At the end of March, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP, they also decided to compromise, promising to conduct an investigation into the Bydgoszcz incident.
The mood in the country was affected by the difficult economic situation. The food supply system was completely disrupted. Economic difficulties could only be overcome with the help of measures that were painful for society, but for this the authorities needed its support. The Warsaw Pact allies, especially the Soviet leadership, were opposed to the introduction of elements of a market economy. However, deep anxiety and grief tempered public excitement for some time - on May 13, an attempt was made on the life of Pope John Paul II in Rome, and on May 28, the primate of Poland, Cardinal Wyszynski, who enjoyed enormous authority, died.
In June, the authorities took a tougher stance. Self-organization of extremely conservative groups took place, putting forward anti-German and anti-Semitic slogans. On June 6, 1981, the Polish leadership received a letter from the CPSU Central Committee, which expressed concern about the state of affairs in Poland, gave an impartial assessment of the current socio-political situation in Polish society and the party, and also outlined recommendations for stabilizing the situation in the country. The leadership of Solidarity tried to cool passions, but the party went on a counter-offensive. On July 14, the PUWP congress began, at which a promise was made to deal with “horizontal structures.” Promises of reforms, including economic ones, were vague. After the party congress, the leadership of Solidarity was no longer able to prevent protests associated with the almost complete cessation of food supplies to cities. In response, the authorities interrupted negotiations with Solidarity. At the trade union congress that began on September 5, its leadership had difficulty curbing the radicals. The congress adopted an “Address to the working people of Eastern Europe” - this is how Solidarity became involved in foreign policy problems for the first time.
Beginning in the fall, the communists waged a systematic offensive. Secret preparations for the introduction of martial law accelerated. The indecisive Kanya, under pressure from Moscow, resigned, and on October 18, Jaruzelski became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, who continued to be prime minister and minister of national defense. “Horizontal structures” were destroyed. Various provocations from the authorities multiplied. Polarization emerged in Solidarity: on the one hand, there was a radicalization of some of its leaders, on the other, there was fatigue and disappointment among the broad masses of ordinary members. The situation worsened sharply at the end of November. Jaruzelski was waiting for the right moment to decide to introduce martial law. The meeting of the All-Polish Solidarity Commission in Gdansk, scheduled for December 11-12, made it possible to intern the entire leadership of the trade union at one stroke.
Since August 1980, both Moscow and Warsaw authorities viewed the existence of an independent organization as contrary to the very essence of the system. Now there is an opportunity to eliminate it. On the night of December 12-13, martial law was introduced. Supreme power passed to the Military Council of National Salvation, headed by Jaruzelski. Subordinate to this council were military commissars operating in all voivodeships, cities, enterprises and institutions. A military order was announced to control a large part of the economy. The activities of trade unions and many other organizations, the press (except for party and military newspapers) and schools were suspended, telephone communications were cut off, and it was forbidden to leave the place of residence without special permission. Strikes, demonstrations, and meetings were prohibited.
The police occupied all the premises of Solidarity. About five thousand people were interned - mainly Solidarity figures, but also opposition intellectuals and members of the PUWP who operated in "horizontal structures". Probably, the authorities expected that, having lost contact with advisers, Walesa would succumb to persuasion, make a statement recognizing martial law and make an appeal to the public. When he refused, he was interned. The enterprises carried out a purge of workers, dismissing Solidarity members.
The introduction of martial law was relatively easy. Solidarity was taken by surprise; in addition, those of its leaders who escaped internment, as well as representatives of the church, issued calls to remain calm. Although Solidarity was dissolved, it continued to operate actively in illegal conditions, remaining one of the most influential social movements in the country.
It was assumed that the response to the actions of the authorities would be a general strike. However, strikes occurred only at some large enterprises. They were suppressed within several days by the actions of special police units, operating with the support of tanks and helicopters. Only in Upper Silesia was the resistance of the striking miners and metallurgists more decisive. On December 15, nine miners were killed during the assault on the Buek mine; The last occupation strike at the Piast mine in Tychy ended on December 28. The initiators and most active participants in the strikes were arrested. During the entire period of martial law, the total number of arrests reached approximately four thousand. About one and a half a dozen people died during the suppression of strikes and the dispersal of demonstrations.
Chapter 2. The attitude of the USSR to the Polish events of 1980-1981.
polish worker strike soviet
In 1944-1945 Poland was liberated from the fascist occupiers by the Soviet Army. Under pressure from the USSR, the Polish United Workers' Party came to power here. And like some other countries in Eastern Europe, Poland became a communist state.
The idea that it is necessary to respect the sovereignty and independence of socialist countries, to take into account the peculiarities of their positions on certain issues, their specific policies, was repeatedly emphasized in the speeches of L.I. Brezhnev and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state.
But this was only a theory, and practice turned out to be different. It was aimed at preserving the paternalistic system of relations between the USSR and other socialist countries created under Stalin. Brezhnev and his entourage, as well as Khrushchev before that, were extremely suspicious and hostile towards any attempts at radical changes, which in the view of the Soviet leadership could mean an attack on the administrative-command bureaucratic system that existed in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. and hostile.
Meanwhile, the crisis processes in etacracy states deepened and intensified. But the Soviet leadership did not consider it possible to really look at the state of affairs and, together with its allies, somehow neutralize them. When the socio-economic and socio-political crisis in Poland resulted in an open conflict between the authorities and the people, the Soviet leadership did not understand its underlying causes or pretended that it did not understand them. The Soviet media reduced the Polish crisis itself mainly to the fact that it was the result of imperialist interference in the affairs of Poland, the activities of Western intelligence services and representatives of anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces in their service. This category included almost all organizations that opposed the policies of the party and state elite, although many of them, especially Solidarity, were supported by the broadest masses of the working class and other sectors of Polish society. Giving their interpretation of the events related to the crisis in Poland, which began in the summer of 1980, the Soviet media differed significantly in their assessments of these events by the PUWP and its leadership, and these assessments were not always brought to the attention of the Soviet public. Thus, Soviet newspapers published only in summary, and not in full, program speeches of the leaders of the PUWP and the PPR, materials from the plenums of the Central Committee of the PUWP, the IX Extraordinary Party Congress, held in July 1981. Meanwhile, the materials of the congress provided a detailed analysis of the reasons that led to crisis, and measures were outlined that, as the then leaders of the country hoped, should lead to normalization of the situation in the country.
The report of the Central Committee of the PUWP to the IX Party Congress noted, in particular, that the crisis in the summer of 1980 was associated with the workers’ action not against socialism, but against the violation of its principles, not against people’s power, but against incorrect methods of government, not against the party, but against mistakes in the policies of its leadership.
The scale and depth of the crisis resulted from many erroneous concepts and decisions in the field of economic and social policy in the 70s. The report named among such mistakes, first of all, the excessive focus of the then Polish leadership, headed by E. Gierek, on the development of economic, scientific and technical ties with the West, on obtaining loans for the modernization of production and the construction of new enterprises, the products of which were sold in Western countries. markets, Poland hoped to pay off the loans received. However, this did not happen. The loans were used ineffectively: they were mainly spent in the sphere of consumption.
The efficiency of the economy was declining due to mismanagement and squandering of means of production and labor, low quality of products, and lack of interest of labor collectives in the results of your work. The principles of social justice and basic moral norms were violated. There has been an unreasonable increase in income disparities. The insufficient development of healthcare, public transport, and school education was painfully perceived by people with low earnings and large families.
As emphasized in the documents of the congress, another reason for the crisis was the departure in political practice from the main principles of socialism, the principle of social justice, the limitation of the content and forms of democracy, the distortion of the principles of democratic centralism and Leninist norms in party work. Incorrect criteria and unfair distribution of produced goods contributed to the emergence of privileged layers and pressure groups that influenced the mechanism of exercising power. This led to a distortion of the leadership role of the party and the way state power functions.
The common feature of all crises in Poland, including the crisis of 1980-1981, despite their specificity and originality, as noted in the congress documents, was that they always gave the same result - an economic crisis and social conflict. The consequence of this situation was the distrust of the people and party masses in the leadership of the party and the country. Mistrust spread to the entire party, which was identified with the policies of the leadership. Those values and achievements that were associated with socialism in the minds of every person: justice, equality, confidence in the future, universal access to culture and education, public care for children, the elderly, lonely and sick people, protection of health and the environment - turned out to be in the second half of the 70s under threat. The promised growth in prosperity did not happen. Instead, there is an economic crisis, inflation, and growing uncertainty about the future. The burden of the crisis was especially felt by the younger generation, deprived of prospects for normal participation in the life of society, in the material, social and socio-political spheres.
The above main provisions of the analysis of the crisis situation by the IX Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP could not but have an impact on the position of the Soviet leadership. Certain adjustments were made to the initial interpretation of events as the result of the machinations of imperialism and internal reaction. In the report of the CPSU Central Committee to the XXVI Party Congress, which was delivered by L.I. Brezhnev, it was said in connection with the Polish events that where “errors and miscalculations in domestic policy are added to the subversive activities of imperialism, the ground arises for the activation of elements hostile to socialism.” At the same time, the report said that “we will not leave socialist Poland, fraternal Poland in trouble and will not give offense.” Thus, in essence, the doctrine of collective “defense of the gains of socialism” put forward during the Czechoslovak events of 1968 was confirmed, i.e. the right of Poland's allies under the Warsaw Pact to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and dictate to the Polish leadership such a line of behavior that the then Soviet leaders considered necessary for the cause of socialism in Poland: a line of decisive rebuff to the forces of internal counter-revolution, to strengthen the leading role of the PUWP in the life of Polish society, to strengthen positions of the administrative-command system, and not at all the line of carrying out political and economic reforms, democratizing society, establishing in it the principles of social justice, which was demanded by the broad masses of communists and working people of the country.
After the 26th Congress of the CPSU, political pressure on the Polish leadership in order to encourage it to pursue a line pleasing to Moscow intensified. In April 1981, a Soviet party and government delegation headed by M.A. went to Warsaw to meet with the leaders of the PUWP. Suslov. On June 5, 1981, the CPSU Central Committee sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. It was a closed document. But it was published by the Polish press. Therefore, the Soviet press was forced to place it on its pages. On June 12, 1981, the text of the letter appeared on the pages of Pravda. The letter said that not only was the situation in Poland dangerous, but it had brought the country to a critical point.
The letter contained reproaches against the PUWP and its leadership, saying that the party was not taking effective measures to combat the counter-revolutionary threat, that within the party itself, random people who openly promoted opportunist views often came to the leadership of local organizations, and experienced and dedicated Party workers with an unblemished reputation.
The letter, finally, emphasized that the offensive of hostile anti-socialist forces in Poland threatens the interests of the entire socialist community, its cohesion, integrity, border security, and that in these conditions it is necessary to prevent the worst, to prevent a national catastrophe, to mobilize all forces to repel the class enemy, to fight against counter-revolution. This requires the revolutionary determination of the party, its activists, its leadership. The party can and must find the strength within itself to turn the tide of events... to direct them in the right direction.
The CPSU letter did not contain a threat of a repetition of the Czechoslovak version of 1968, but it was not ruled out that such an option was possible if the Polish leadership remained inactive.
The exceptional complexity of the internal situation in Poland, the sharp exacerbation of socio-economic problems in the country, the deterioration of supplies to the population, rising prices, inflation, strikes, the activities of extremist forces striving for power, active interference in the affairs of Poland by Western powers and their intelligence services, which encouraged extremist forces to the intensification of confrontation with the party and the state, and finally, the pressure of the Soviet leadership on Poland - all this forced the then first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland W. Jaruzelski to decide to introduce martial law in the country, create the Military Council of National Salvation, and intern the leaders of Solidarity "and former members of the Polish leadership, removed from power after the outbreak of the crisis, the prohibition of trade union activities, strikes, the closure of a number of print publications, etc. As W. Jaruzelski noted, the decision to introduce martial law “was the most dramatic decision in my life, it sits in me like a thorn, and will sit as long as I live.”
Different assessments are given of what happened in those days. Some believe that the introduction of martial law was a forced step, that in conditions when the country found itself on the brink of an abyss, only martial law could save it from a national catastrophe, civil war, external military intervention, which could only be avoided in one way: to show that The Polish leadership itself can defend socialism and its gains. Others believe that the introduction of martial law was a tragic mistake; it set Poland back, aggravated the crisis in the country, and did not solve the problems that emerged during the crisis. The leadership of the party and state won tactically by introducing military position, thereby extending his stay in power by almost a decade. But it lost strategically, interrupting the reform process, and then carrying out them cautiously, half-heartedly, belatedly, which ultimately led to the discrediting of the PUWP, the public’s conviction that the ruling party and the state apparatus led by it are not able to effectively govern the country. All this ultimately led to the defeat of the PUWP in the elections in the summer of 1989, as a result of which the party first ceased to be ruling, and then ceased to exist altogether. It was replaced in January 1990 by the social democracy of the Polish Republic. Of course, the party itself, its leaders and the policies they pursue are primarily to blame for such a sad turn of events for the PUWP. But it was carried out in an extremely unfavorable external environment for the PUWP and its reformist wing.
Thus, it should be noted that the Soviet leadership underestimated or did not want to correctly assess the events in Poland in 1980-1981. They tried to reduce the causes of the crisis to imperialist interference in the affairs of Poland, the activities of Western intelligence services and representatives of anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces in their service. In fact, the scale and depth of the crisis consisted of many erroneous concepts and decisions in the field of economic and social policy in the 70s.
Subsequently, understanding the seriousness of the Polish events, the Soviet leadership realized that the “offensive of hostile anti-socialist forces in Poland” threatened the interests of the entire socialist community, its cohesion, integrity, border security, and that in these conditions it was necessary to take appropriate measures. But the leadership of the USSR decided not to use force, since the introduction of troops into Polish territory could lead to unpredictable consequences. The only solution was to introduce martial law, which was done.
Conclusion
In the summer of 1980, Poland's economic situation began to deteriorate; the huge debt to Western banks, caused by the large amount of borrowing made in the 70s, contributes to further complications. All this causes growing discontent of the working class, but the signals coming from the primary party organizations are neglected. In July and August, economic unrest occurs at numerous enterprises. The authorities are adopting a principle that contradicts basic economic laws: the teams of enterprises that interrupt their work receive a significant increase in wages. This causes a chain reaction - more and more enterprises are threatened with strikes.
Thus, in August, mass protests by workers begin, and their demands expand from economic to social and political. Here the new trade union association “Solidarity” enters the arena, headed by Lech Walesa.
Meanwhile, the country's international position worsened. L.I. Brezhnev uttered a threatening phrase: “We will not leave fraternal Poland in trouble and will not allow it to be offended.” However, the USSR did not decide on a military operation.
In January 1981, tensions in Polish society increased. Prices rose wildly, and remnants of goods disappeared from store shelves. “Hunger marches” took place in various areas. The communists tried to save the situation by electing a new energetic party leader - General W. Jaruzelski. But on November 28 a general strike began. Then Jaruzelski, as head of the Council of Ministers, on the night of December 12-13, introduced martial law and banned the activities of Solidarity. But she continued her activities underground.
By the end of the 1980s, Solidarity would become legal. He will achieve impressive success in parliamentary elections. As a result, the first government in the Eastern bloc countries will be created in Poland, headed by an opponent of the communist system (T. Mazowiecki), although several key posts were still occupied by communists. The compromise marked the beginning of fundamental changes in Poland, which were to lead to the creation of a democratic state.
List of used literature
1.Bronislavsky E., Vachnadze G.N. Polish dialogue. Events in Poland through the eyes of Polish, Soviet, American, English, West German and French journalists. - Tbilisi: Ganatleba, 1990.
2.Lavrenov S.Ya. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts / S.Ya. Lavrenov, I.M. Popov. - M.: AST Publishing House LLC. 2003.
.Loiko L.V. Strength test: Pol.-Soviet island. friendship: formation, development. - Minsk: Belarus, 1989.
.Losoto O., Tretyakov M. Lech Walesa. Political portrait // Echo of the Planet. - 1989. - No. 22.
.Immersion in the quagmire: (Anatomy of stagnation) / Comp. and general ed. T.A. Notkina. - M.: Progress, 1991.
.Poland. Questions and answers: Directory / General. ed. and comp. V.A. Svetlova. - M.: Politizdat, 1991.
.Tymovsky M., Kenevich J., Holzer E. History of Poland. - M.: Publishing house “The Whole World”, 2004.
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Political portraits. Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov Medvedev Roy Alexandrovich
Crisis in Poland. 1980–1981
The economic and political situation in Poland, relatively stable in the 1970s, began to deteriorate suddenly and rapidly from the first months of 1980. In the summer there were strikes at many enterprises in Poland. Particularly alarming to Soviet leaders was the Lublin railway strike, which was called just three weeks before the start of the Moscow Olympics and blocked one of the most important railway lines leading from the GDR to the Soviet Union. Polish leaders, however, tried in every possible way to downplay the scale of the discontent that gripped the country, presenting the strikes in the Lublin Voivodeship as an unfortunate misunderstanding. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP Edward Terek, going on vacation to Crimea at the end of July, took with him more than 35 representatives of the Polish authorities. According to the testimony of one of the former workers of the CPSU Central Committee, Vladimir Voronkov, the conversation between Brezhnev and Terek in Crimea, both in content and tone, was quite ordinary and did not differ from the previous “Crimean meetings” of these leaders. Terek was only “reproached” for the fact that, when deciding to increase meat prices, Polish leaders did not calculate the possible social consequences and did not organize the necessary explanatory work, which caused short-term strikes. Brezhnev asked Terek not to forget about the growing ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism in recent years and, hinting at projects of some political reforms being developed in Poland, declared the unacceptability of political pluralism for socialist countries. Unlike Brezhnev, who spent most of the day on the beach and in the sea, Terek rarely went to the sea and looked depressed and gloomy. He did not watch the Western action films so beloved by the owner of the dacha and clearly avoided the usual society and its entertainment here. On the other hand, Terek contacted Warsaw several times a day via HF. The service staff and security could not help but see these oddities in the behavior of the guest and, according to the established procedure here, reported everything to their management. These reports, naturally, went to both Brezhnev and Andropov.
The situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, and the code messages that Yu. Andropov received daily from the KGB resident in Poland, General Vitaly Pavlov, became increasingly alarming. On the evening of August 14, Andropov received a message about the beginning of a strike at the large Gdansk shipyard. Lenin. The Workers' Defense Committee (WDC), which had been formed earlier in Poland, managed to involve the entire 16,000-strong workforce of the enterprise in the strike. The leader of the action was 36-year-old electrician Lech Walesa, a father of six children, a deeply religious Catholic and a gifted speaker. Another ciphergram said that the Polish authorities began to move airborne units to Gdansk. The workers, however, did not give rise to military and police intervention. Their behavior surprised even the Western correspondents who flocked to the coast. “If Marx came to life today,” wrote one journalist, “he would not believe his eyes.” Indeed, angry workers in the socialist country stopped the work of ports, factories and factories along the entire Baltic coast. Moreover, the main form of their behavior was not manifestations and demonstrations, but collective prayers. In Gdansk, thousands of strikers and members of their families, kneeling on both sides of the shipyard. Lenin, prayed and sang psalms in front of a portrait of a Pole, the Pope, decorated with flowers. Terek, who urgently returned to Warsaw, turned to banking consortiums of capitalist countries with a request for new rescue loans.
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP clearly did not know what to do. The strikes expanded, capturing other cities and provinces; The independent trade union movement “Solidarity” was also quickly formed. It was necessary to make more and more concessions, but the leaders of Solidarity, having won one victory, immediately put forward new demands, including political ones. On August 20 or 21, E. Terek invited his closest associate Stanislaw Kania, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, responsible for party control over the security forces of Poland, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Poland Stanislaw Kowalczyk. Terek asked them to hold a meeting with Lieutenant General V. Pavlov and hint at “the need to strengthen the Soviet military presence in Poland.” When Kani asked what was meant by the word “strengthening,” Terek remarked with irritation: “The Soviet comrades themselves know what it is and how to do it...” The meeting of Kani and Kovalchik with Pavlov took place on the same day, and information about the position and proposals the three most influential figures in the Polish leadership were immediately sent to Moscow. Soviet leaders were concerned, but were in no hurry to respond or make a decision. Some sources contain evidence that L. I. Brezhnev, having read V. Pavlov’s report, remarked: “Russia has not yet fought on two fronts. And he won't fight. We've made a mess, now let them sort it out themselves. And we will look and, if necessary, correct it.”
On August 25, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee formed a special commission of the Central Committee for Poland (the so-called “Suslov commission”). It included M. Suslov, A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, K. Chernenko, M. Zimyanin, K. Rusakov and a number of other members of the Central Committee. Polish events were thus placed on a par with Afghan ones. However, few members of the Politburo thought about the Afghan option for solving Polish problems. On September 5, 1980, the urgently convened VI Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee decided to remove E. Terek from the post of First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, electing Stanislav Kania in his place. These changes were presented to the country's public not as a turn in policy, but as a result of the illness of the former leader. Speaking at the plenum, S. Kanya said: “I accept the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP under unusual circumstances. Comrade Terek, who has led our party for the last 10 years, is seriously ill. Due to his illness, this is not the time to evaluate his activities. I am confident that these assessments will be fair... We wish him a speedy recovery.” Stanislav Kanya was not popular in the country, but did not cause irritation in society. Many in Poland said: “Better Kanya than Vanya,” hinting at the danger of Soviet intervention. Solidarity ideologists, however, did not believe in the possibility of Soviet occupation. “I am convinced,” KZR leader Jacek Kuroń wrote in November, “that there will be no intervention... I believe, and I am not alone in this, that an invasion of Poland would be extremely costly for the Russians and that they do not want it at all.” The same was the opinion of the KGB think tanks and Andropov himself. The head of the information and analytical department of the PSU, General N. Leonov, recalled: “Every morning I had to report to the head of intelligence telegrams that we recommended for distribution to members of the Politburo, the secretariat of the Central Committee and departments. One day, when the pile of recommended telegrams included two or three that covered the situation in Poland, Kryuchkov, without looking up from reading, asked: “What do you think, Leonov, will stabilization among the Poles now begin?” I took more air into my lungs and very sadly, although with conviction, said: “No, I think that the opposition won, it won the main thing - the people. And power itself will fall into her hands someday.”
Some time passed, and Andropov invited several people from intelligence for a frank conversation about the situation in Poland. At the table were the head of intelligence, his deputy, who was responsible on the operational line for the work area in Eastern Europe, the head of the corresponding department and two representatives of the information and analytical department, including me... I honestly and frankly outlined our understanding of the situation in Poland, drew attention that my report does not contradict the information that is regularly sent to the Politburo through intelligence. I remember I ended my short speech with the words: “The party and government in Poland are losing control of the situation. If the current trends in the development of the internal political situation continue, an explosion is inevitable, and it could happen in the very near future, measured in a few months.” The conversation took place in the fall of 1980. There was silence at the table. Andropov looked detachedly out the window and asked:
– What do you think power in Poland is based on now?
– Practically on three pillars: party functionaries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. The social base has been thinned to the extreme...
After asking a few more questions, Andropov summed up the conversation in an unexpected way:
– Let’s assume that today we had neither winners nor losers. We need to think about how to stabilize the situation in Poland for a long period, but proceed from the fact that the limit of our interventions abroad has been exhausted.
It couldn't have been clearer. For the participants in that conversation, it became clear that the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine,” which provided for the use of the armed forces of the USSR to maintain the socialist system in the European countries of the Warsaw Pact, had already died. The Soviet Union no longer had the strength for such operations.”
The General Staff of the Soviet Army was nevertheless preparing a large-scale plan for the occupation of Poland “just in case.” Approximate calculations showed that for the rapid success of such an operation from a purely military point of view, it would be necessary to use at least 30 divisions stationed in the western regions of the country, and part of the troops located in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. These plans did not only exist on paper. From December 8 to December 21, 1980, the largest joint military exercise “Soyuz-80” in the entire history of the socialist community was held in close proximity to the Polish borders. Although the exercises formally ended on December 21, USSR Defense Minister D. Ustinov verbally ordered Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, to continue carrying out additional military training tasks. Obviously, the talk was about pressure on the Polish leadership and society.
The Polish opposition responded to this move by the Soviet Union with an impressive demonstration of its influence in the country. A monument to the victims of the regime was erected in Gdansk. Three giant steel crosses decorated with anchors symbolized the victims of the labor unrest of 1956, 1970 and 1976. The anchors symbolized the sea that feeds the workers of the coast, they also recalled the German occupation, when the anchor was a symbol of the Resistance. There were four inscriptions on the monument: a list of victims of the regime, a blessing from Pope John Paul II, a psalm and a stanza from a poem by Czeslaw Milosz, written by him in 1950: “You, who brought pain to the common man, you, who laugh at his pain, you should not feel in safety". Hundreds of thousands of people gathered for the unveiling of the monument on December 16, 1980. The leaders of the PUWP were also invited, and they could not help but come to the ceremony. This is how the special correspondent of the French Le Monde, Bernard Guetta, described this event: “It seems that all of Poland has gathered here in Gdansk thanks to Solidarity... Already twenty times since August, incredible things have happened in the country. And yet, what remains incredible are these three giant steel crosses that seem ineradicable and reach high into the sky to confirm their strength, these words written in gold on the wall of the shipyard: “They gave their lives so that you could live with dignity.” Is it possible to imagine a monument to the victims of 1956 in Budapest, to the victims of the Wall in East Berlin, to the victims of Stalin in the USSR, to the victims of the Slansky trial in Prague? Here history tells the truth, calmly and without hatred. He speaks simply, because a people deprived of history cannot be free, cannot forgive and turn to the future...
At 16.50 representatives of the party, church and trade union appear. Those gathered met with silence the member of the Politburo and the chairman of the State Council, the secretary of the voivodeship committee of the party, the secretary of the Central Committee, the minister of culture and the deputy prime minister. The crowd applauds Lech Walesa, the bishops and the commander of the Polish navy.
At exactly 5 p.m., shipyard sirens sound. It's cold, it's raining. Miners' standards, Our Lady banners and national flags flap in the wind as if in salute. The crowd gathered in front of the monument and on the neighboring streets was cut into even squares by the yellow helmets of shipbuilders mobilized for law enforcement. The orchestra and choir perform a sad, beautiful composition specially composed by Krzysztof Penderecki. Then the roll call of the dead. Actor Daniel Olbrychski, illuminated by spotlights in the night, reads the names of the victims one after another. After each name, the crowd says: “He is with us!”
Relatives of the victims, including a woman shaking in tears, cut the cord holding up the symbolic sail covering the monument. Lech Walesa lights the Eternal Flame, which will burn between three crosses. 17 hours 25 minutes. The ceremony is over."
It was impossible to cope with such a movement. However, both the Central Committee of the PUWP and the Kremlin could not yet understand and accept this. From the very first months of 1981, Solidarity began to rapidly expand its ranks. Solidarity organizations arose not only in cities, but also in villages, in student groups. By February 1981, 11 million Poles, that is, the majority of the country's adult population, had become members of the Solidarity trade union. Essentially, a regime of dual power was formed in Poland, which, of course, could not last long.
Stanislav Kanya not only could not, but also did not want to use force against Solidarity; he was looking for a compromise and was clearly playing a double game in relation to the Kremlin. The Polish Minister of Defense, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, also took part in this game. He admitted this later in memoirs and interviews. “We had to play a kind of double game,” said the general. – It was a difficult game, not without tricks. By the way, the game was two-sided.”
The refusal of military intervention and intervention in Poland did not at all mean that the Soviet leadership had come to terms with the possible loss of Poland as a member of the Warsaw Pact and the socialist community. According to V. Voronkov, in a face-to-face conversation with S. Kanya, Brezhnev said: “If we see that you are being overturned, then we will enter.” An employee of the Polish sector from the CPSU Central Committee, who translated the conversation between the two leaders, told V. Voronkov about this. Stanislav Kanya also wrote about this phrase in his memoirs, although in a different edition. “Okay,” said Brezhnev. – We will not send troops. But if the situation becomes complicated, we will enter. But we won’t go in without you.” Kanya admits that the last words puzzled him greatly. The Politburo Commission on Poland created a special working group at the level of its deputies, which developed a plan for total pressure on the Polish leadership and society. This political and ideological pressure was expressed in the form of constant telephone calls and meetings in Moscow and Warsaw. Mikhail Suslov spent several days in Poland and the Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Zimyanin spent several weeks. Letters were sent from Moscow to friends about the threat to socialism and about the “intrigues of imperialism” in Poland. These letters were addressed to the leadership of communist and workers' parties in other countries. The Polish leadership also knew about these messages. The Polish economy was heavily dependent on trade and supplies from the USSR and on Soviet loans. The country especially needed Soviet foreign currency loans. Under the Terek regime, the debt to the West increased many times, and now there were not enough funds to pay interest. This gave the Soviet Union important levers of economic pressure on Poland. Moscow has its own saying: “No need for tanks, just banks.” Military pressure was also applied almost continuously. Back in January 1981, it was decided to hold large command and staff exercises in Poland in the spring. Reporting on this at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, D. Ustinov said: “We plan to conduct maneuvers in Poland in March. It seems to me that these maneuvers should be raised somewhat, that is, in other words, make it clear that we have forces at the ready.”
My memories of the events of 1980–1981. Not only E. Terek, S. Kanya and W. Jaruzelski were left in Poland, but also the KGB resident in Warsaw, Lieutenant General V. G. Pavlov. Vitaly Pavlov’s book “I Was a KGB Resident in Poland” was published in Polish back in 1994. In Russia in 1998, V. Pavlov’s book “Leaders of Poland through the Eyes of an Intelligence Officer” appeared in bookstores. The authors of these memoirs are not always unanimous in their assessments; one can often find different versions about certain events. However, all participants or witnesses to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981 note the low activity in the “Suslov Commission” of both Suslov himself and Gromyko and, on the contrary, the greater activity of Andropov and Ustinov. According to V. Pavlov, in the late autumn and winter of 1980/81, Andropov called him in Warsaw almost every day. Several times Pavlov was called to Andropov for a report, and also as an intermediary during meetings of the KGB Chairman with the Ministers of Internal Affairs of Poland: first with Stanislav Kowalczyk, then with Miroslav Milevsky, and from August 1981 with Czeslaw Kiszczak. Andropov treated these Polish ministers differently. For example, he was irritated by the lack of professionalism and political shortsightedness of S. Kowalczyk, who had headed the Polish police and security agencies since 1973 and was considered a close ally of E. Terek. “I had the opportunity,” writes Pavlov, “to witness several meetings between S. Kovalchik and the Chairman of the KGB. In the process, S. Kovalchik gave very limited, shallow political assessments of the situation in the country and turned out to be completely helpless in the field of professional characterization of ensuring the state security of the country.
At the same time, I saw that he had great respect for Yu.V. Andropov and his statements. And since the Chairman, through government information, was very well versed in Polish problems, his recommendations, expressed in a very tactful manner, were important for S. Kowalczyk, and through him, E. Terek. At the same time, after each conversation with S. Kovalchik, the Chairman of the KGB asked me in bewilderment why the Polish minister had not understood the affairs and tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and remained so ignorant of the specifics of activities to ensure state security?
My answer boiled down to the fact that this is happening because S. Kovalchik in the real sense is not a political figure, but a simple party worker, and at a low government level. He was a good assistant and executor for E. Terek in Katowice, and remained so in Warsaw, as a minister.” Andropov was also not a professional intelligence officer or counterintelligence agent. However, explaining to Pavlov his position and his responsibility, he once said: “Since I was appointed to head such a department, everything else is my competence. I act as I see fit. If I don’t do what I need to do, they will replace me, but no one should take care of me, much less tell me what and how to do.”
Miroslav Milevsky, according to Pavlov, was not only a skilled politician, but also the most trained professional who had previously led Polish foreign intelligence. But Czeslaw Kiszczak, who took over as Minister of Internal Affairs in August 1981, was also an experienced professional who had worked for many years in military counterintelligence. The main topic in Andropov's conversations With Polish ministers asked about their attitude towards the leaders of the Polish opposition. We know that Andropov did not favor dissidents in the Soviet Union, but he tried to avoid mass repressions by using various forms of pressure on the opposition. He “taught” this to his Polish colleagues. General V. Pavlov testifies: “At the beginning of August 1981, I accompanied Ch. Kishchak during his visit to Yu. Andropov to establish personal contact as a minister. Then a very detailed conversation took place between the Chairman of the KGB and the new Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland. Ch. Kishchak spoke in detail about the situation that had arisen in the country by this time and shared his plans in the event of the introduction of martial law. After listening to the minister, Andropov gave him the same recommendations that he had already made when meeting with M. Milevsky as Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs six months earlier: not to follow the path of mass repression.
“We must approach this,” he said, “very carefully. Arrest one hundred people and you will immediately create many hundreds of enemies from among their family members and close friends. It is better to subtly remove the “key figures”. At the same time, Yu. V. Andropov gave an example from his observations of the work of timber raftsmen in Karelia. When there was a log jam on the river, the rafters carefully selected the “key” log and deftly pulled it out. And that’s it, many hundreds of other logs began to dissolve and the jam was cleared. This is how,” Andropov said, “it’s better to act.” Don’t get carried away with the numbers, because the more people you arrest, the more noise there will be in the West.”
The topic of the opposition in Poland and its “key figures” also dominated the Soviet-Polish summit, which took place on March 4, 1981, immediately after the end of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The entire Polish party delegation, led by Kania and Jaruzelski, was present at this meeting. On the Soviet side there were Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov. The conversation lasted more than two hours and at times was in a raised voice. V.I. Voronkov later recalled: “I had the opportunity to witness this meeting. It struck me not so much with its content - the leaders of the CPSU expressed their complaints unchanged from meeting to meeting - but with the aggressive, rude unceremoniousness of the Soviet masters. Kania and Jaruzelski were scolded in turn as guilty schoolchildren, clearly trying to intimidate them. They were accused of allowing the creation of a mass anti-communist party in Poland, of allowing Solidarity to attract the working class into its ranks, of losing power as a result of the “rotten” policy of compromise with the “class enemy”, of not listening to “advice” "Moscow. At some point in the conversation, a clearly overexcited Ustinov jumped up from his seat, leaned over the table towards Kanya and, breaking into a scream, began to ask menacingly: “Comrade Kanya, how long are you going to deceive us? Why do Kuron, Michnik, Buyak travel around the country and not sit where they should - in prison? Why do you condone Western interference in your internal affairs? Our patience is running out! We have someone to rely on in Poland! You have two weeks to restore order in Poland!”
Kanya clearly did not expect such pressure. He turned noticeably pale, but did not lose his composure. Having immediately assured Brezhnev that he would imprison these gentlemen tomorrow, immediately upon returning to Warsaw, and thereby knocking out the most serious accusations against him, he began to present his thoughts on the situation in Poland in a rather monotonous and lengthy manner. The intensity of the conversation had clearly faded; Kanya played like a skilled psychologist.” Kanya, of course, could not fulfill his promise, and did not try. Although Solidarity actually served as an opposition political party, claiming power in the country, formally it was a legal trade union, with which the country’s authorities had already entered into several agreements. Solidarity included more than one million members of the PUWP. Moreover, about 20% of the members of the Central Committee of the PUWP were also members of this trade union. Lenin wrote in 1920 that communists should work even in reactionary trade unions and, in general, always be where the masses are. Solidarity actively supported the church - from the Polish cardinal to the Pope. In Poland this circumstance could not be ignored. Moreover, it was not Kuron or Bujak who played the main role in the workers' opposition of 1981. The leader and symbol of the opposition was Lech Walesa.
The opposition movement in Poland hardly affected the Polish army, which enjoyed traditional and great respect. There were no noticeable fluctuations in other power structures. This circumstance suggested that martial law could be introduced in Poland without the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. Some preparations were made for this. Back in February 1981, the Polish Sejm approved General W. Jaruzelski as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland. The general retained the post of Minister of National Defense, which allowed him to concentrate greater power in his hands. The new prime minister instructed the heads of the security forces to complete the development of a joint action plan in the shortest possible time in the event of a state of emergency being introduced in the country. However, there was no consensus on this matter in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PUWP. The Central Committee of the PUWP had several groups, each of which enjoyed significant influence in the country and in the party. Analysts from the CPSU Central Committee classified as “revisionists”, people ideologically close to Solidarity, a group of members of the PUWP Central Committee, headed by Mieczyslaw Rakovski, editor-in-chief of the magazine “Politics” - the organ of the PUWP Central Committee. Kania and Jaruzelski were classified as “centrists,” people committed to both socialism and nationalism, who believed that “a Pole will always be able to come to an agreement with another Pole.” In Moscow, such activists of the PUWP as S. Kochyolok and S. Olshovsky were classified as principled communists, loyal internationalists, or “leftists.” At the head of this group in 1981 was Tadeusz Grabski, an experienced economist and recent factory director from the Katowice Voivodeship. However, the “leftists” from the PUWP did not enjoy any significant influence in the country. Even within the party itself, only a few tens of thousands of people supported them. For a party that had 3 million 70 thousand members and candidates at the end of 1980, this was very little.
Regarding the support of the Politburo. Who can it rely on? Their army is 400 thousand people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 100 thousand and reservists - 300 thousand, thus 800 thousand people. But it must be said that between Kanya and Jaruzelski there are many differences in views on certain issues. Comrade Jaruzelski again expressed a request for his release from the post of prime minister. We popularly explained to him that it is necessary to remain in this post and fulfill the duties assigned to him with dignity...”
There is no need to write here about all the meetings and negotiations between Soviet and Polish leaders that took place in May, June-July, and August. The IX Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP, held in July 1981, weakened the representation of the “left” or “healthy forces” in the party leadership and, on the contrary, increased the influence of “opportunists” and “revisionists”. The economic and social situation worsened. Hunger marches took place in cities across the country, including Warsaw, and a warning strike in Poland on August 5 involved 60% of all day shift workers. The First Congress of the independent trade union “Solidarity” was scheduled for September. The day before, it was announced that large-scale exercises of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states would begin on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, in close proximity to the Polish border. The action was carried out under the name “West-81”, it was personally led by Marshal of the USSR D. Ustinov. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers took part in the exercises, a lot of equipment, and tanks and artillery in many cases fired live shells. The defense ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia acted as observers. But Ustinov paid the most attention to Jaruzelski.
After the Solidarity congress, hostility towards S. Kane in the Kremlin grew so much that the issue of his removal was discussed almost openly in both Moscow and Warsaw. On October 18, 1981, Kanya was relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. This decision was by no means unanimous. About 100 members of the Central Committee of the PUWP voted for Kani’s resignation, and about 80 voted against it. General W. Jaruzelski was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. All state power in Poland was now concentrated in the hands of a popular general in the country. However, Jaruzelski was not only a communist and an internationalist, but also a Polish patriot, and he clearly did not intend to unconditionally carry out all the instructions of Moscow. The situation around Poland was discussed at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on October 29. All members of the Politburo spoke in favor of increasing political and economic pressure on Poland, but were against military intervention; Yu. Andropov, in particular, said: “Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from fraternal countries. However, we need to stick to our line - not to send our troops into Poland.” The next day, at a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, D. Ustinov also stated: “Under no circumstances, even if the Polish leadership asks, will we send Soviet and other troops into Poland.” This did not prevent the Allied Forces headquarters from conducting another military-tactical exercise in November on Polish territory at the Zhigansky training ground and scheduling a new large military exercise for December 24, also on Polish territory.
The political and economic situation in Poland in November 1981 continued to become more complicated. In addition to the official protests of the Soviet authorities regarding various kinds of demonstrative actions of Solidarity, unofficial but very harsh messages were also sent to Jaruzelski with reproaches for conniving at “anti-Sovietism” and almost “betraying the cause of socialism.” However, there was no frankness on either side. Jaruzelski's request to send one of the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to Poland was rejected. When asked by Jaruzelski whether Poland could count on military assistance from the Soviet Union if the situation in the country became critical, Brezhnev did not give a clear answer. Grocery stores in Poland were empty; only vinegar was available in abundance. Products were issued on cards, but not in a complete set. The junction was approaching. On December 10, another Politburo meeting was held in Moscow to discuss Polish problems. Speaking at this meeting, Yu. Andropov said: “I would like to say that our position, as it was formulated at the last meeting of the Politburo and previously expressed repeatedly by Leonid Ilyich, is absolutely correct and we should not deviate from it. In other words, we take the position of international assistance, we are concerned about the current situation in Poland, but as for carrying out Operation X, this must entirely be the decision of the Polish comrades, as they decide, so be it. We will not insist on this and we will not dissuade... If Comrade Kulikov really spoke about sending troops, then I think he did it wrong. We can't take risks. We do not intend to send troops into Poland. This is the correct position, and we need to adhere to it to the end. I don’t know what the situation will be with Poland, but even if Poland is under the rule of Solidarity, it will be one thing. And if capitalist countries fall on the Soviet Union, and they already have a corresponding agreement with various kinds of economic and political sanctions, then it will be very difficult for us. We must take care of our country and the strengthening of the Soviet Union. This is our main line... We can tell the Poles that we treat Polish events with understanding. This is a well-established formulation, and there is no reason for us to change it. At the same time, we will have to somehow extinguish the mood of Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders regarding the introduction of troops. There can be no entry of troops into Poland. I think that we can instruct our ambassador to visit Jaruzelski and inform him about this.”
After a sleepless night from December 11 to 12, 1981 and a meeting with the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General Florian Sawicki and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland C. Kiszczak, Jaruzelski decided to introduce martial law in the country. Jaruzelski's speech on this occasion took place on the night of December 13th.
By all criteria of such actions, the actions of the security forces in Poland were fast and effective. Almost all Solidarity leaders were detained and interned in the first hours of martial law. The power crisis was overcome, but only for a few years. In 1989, Solidarity won the parliamentary elections, and in December 1990, L. Walesa was replaced as President of the Republic of Poland by W. Jaruzelski, who, as far as can be judged, retained the authority and respect of the Polish people.
In connection with the publication of his book “Martial Law. Why..." Wojciech Jaruzelski said in an interview with the Polish weekly Przeględ Tygodnowy: "If I had not decided to introduce martial law in December 1981, then a Soviet armed intervention would have taken place. This is already a proven fact. The PPR leadership took this forced and dramatic step because it considered it expedient to solve the internal Polish problem on its own.” Having admitted the great guilt of the leadership he led (and noting that it should not fall entirely on his shoulders), Jaruzelski noted: “By introducing martial law in the country, I wanted first of all to save it from disaster, from Soviet armed intervention, to protect the beginning of economic reforms who were making their way in Poland in those years.” We see today from previously secret documents of the CPSU Central Committee that the Soviet leadership did not intend to occupy Poland even if Solidarity had seized power. However, based on the behavior and statements of Soviet leaders, a completely different conclusion could be drawn in 1981, and Jaruzelski was sincerely convinced that he was saving the country from a bloody conflict with unpredictable consequences. Before him was the lesson of Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979. But Soviet leaders also remembered these lessons.
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From the book The Soviet Union in Local Wars and Conflicts author Lavrenov SergeyThe Solidarity phenomenon of 1980–1981. In the summer of 1980, the whole world was shocked by the events in the Polish city of Gdansk. On the night of August 16-17 at the shipyard named after. Lenin, the Interfactory Strike Committee was created, which came out with unprecedented criticism of the Polish authorities. In his
From the book History of Korea: from antiquity to the beginning of the 21st century. author Kurbanov Sergey Olegovich§ 2. VI Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. An attempt to “open” North Korean society in the 1980s. The VI Congress of the WPK was held from October 10 to 14, 1980. As at the previous congress, about 3,000 delegates took part in its work. The program of the VI Congress of the WPK was also quite ordinary:
From the book General History in Questions and Answers author Tkachenko Irina Valerievna33. What is the socio-economic and political crisis in the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1970-1980s? In the second half of the twentieth century. In the countries of Eastern Europe, relatively stable growth rates of industrial production remained. Production was constantly growing
From the book of the USSR. Life after death author Team of authors From the book History and Cultural Studies [Ed. second, revised and additional] author Shishova Natalya Vasilievna14.3. Soviet society during the years of war and peace. Crisis and collapse of the Soviet system (40–80s) General characteristics In this period of the history of Soviet society, as in the previous one, a number of stages can be distinguished. The first of them is the years of the Second World War. At this stage of the Soviet
author Korolev Kirill Mikhailovich“Mitki”, 1980s Vladimir Shinkarev The most striking example of “internal emigration” of the 1980s was the Leningrad creative group “Mitki”, around which its own subculture was formed. Its “visual manifestations” are vests, tarpaulin boots, padded jackets,
From the book St. Petersburg. Autobiography author Korolev Kirill MikhailovichSeminar by Boris Strugatsky: territory of the future, 1980s Andrey Stolyarov Not as radical as the Mitki movement, but still an undoubted form of “internal emigration” were informal literary associations. And among them stood apart the one that is still active today
author22.3. SYSTEM OF BOOK PUBLISHING AND BOOK TRADE IN THE USSR IN THE 1960s–1980s In the 1960s–1980s, further development of the national economy, science and culture took place against the backdrop of increasing complexity of socio-economic relations and the accumulation of contradictions in Soviet society. History of bookmaking
From the book History of the Book: Textbook for Universities author Govorov Alexander Alekseevich22.4. THE BOOK IN THE USSR IN THE 1960s–1980s During the course of scientific research, the main groups of readers were identified and characterized. Active readers, the bulk of whom were the intelligentsia, suffered most from the shortage of books. This group included
From the book Modern History author Ponomarev M.V.No. 2. Systemic crisis of industrial society in the late 1960s - mid-1980s Preparation of graphic materials The problem of the systemic crisis of industrial society, which ushered in the era of post-industrial development and globalization, postmodernism and post-secularization,
From the book GULAG by Ann AppelbaumChapter 27 1980s: monuments are crushed The torn base of the monument is crushed, The steel of jackhammers screams. A steep solution of special cement was designed to last for thousands of centuries.<…>Everything that is made by hands in the world can be scrapped by hands. But the fact is that
" Assessments of the events of that era vary greatly both within Poland itself and beyond its borders. During martial law, repression took place in the country: as a result of clashes with the police, more than 30 people. died. But in general, the scale of repression, as well as the reaction of the opposition itself during this period, was moderate and even somewhat muted, given the brewing consumer crisis in the country. The Catholic Church of Poland played a key role in preventing the escalation of the conflict on both sides.
Start of operation
Pro-Western unrest in the Polish trade union environment began to be felt more and more acutely, especially in the context of the impending consumer crisis. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time 1st Secretary of the PUWP, head of government and minister of defense, understood that the main destabilizing threat came from the Solidarity organization, which enjoyed the support of the population. On the morning of December 12, 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski called the leadership of the USSR and said the following: “... on the night of December 12-13 of this year. Martial law will be introduced throughout the entire territory of the People's Republic of Poland. I place full responsibility for this step on myself..."
On the night of December 12-13, 1981, telephone communications were cut off throughout Poland. As a result, the leaders of the opposition anti-communist movement Solidarity instantly found themselves isolated. Tanks and armored personnel carriers appeared on the streets. A statement by General Jaruzelski was broadcast on television that “the hands of the adventurers must be tied before they push the Fatherland into the abyss of a fratricidal war.” The general also announced the creation of the Military Council of National Salvation ( English).
Causes
results
As a result of this military action, the local trade union committees of Solidarity were significantly weakened, and many leaders were simply intimidated. But in general, Solidarity continued to operate under the leadership of Lech Walesa, who temporarily chose a policy of non-resistance, well known to the Poles since the partition of the country. A striking manifestation of the ongoing underground activity even at this time was the systematic publication of periodicals, leaflets and bulletins. The publishers were secretly supported by the Catholic Church, which maintained a strong position in Polish society.
On July 17, 1986, the Polish government adopted an amnesty law; in the period until February 21, 1987, 1,200 participants in anti-government protests (of which 225 were serving sentences in prison) took advantage of it.
US economic sanctions against Poland
Immediately after the introduction of martial law, the US government imposed economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR. The following year, 1982, Poland was stripped of its MFN trade status and its bid to join the International Monetary Fund was blocked. The 1984 amnesty opened the door to the normalization of economic relations between the two countries. On February 20, 1987, President Reagan announced the lifting of remaining sanctions and the restoration of normal trade.
The sanctions had a negative impact on the Polish economy (the Polish government claimed that they cost the Polish economy $15 billion between 1981 and 1985). The losses were partially offset by Soviet loans, which totaled 3.4 million [ specify] dollars, and an increase in supplies of raw materials and energy.
Modern estimates
In 2005-2008 They tried to bring Jaruzelski to trial for introducing a dictatorship.
Notes
Literature
- Lavrenov S.A., Popov I.M. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. - M.: Astrel, 2003. - P. 391-409. - ISBN 5-271-05709-7
| Polish uprisings | ||
|---|---|---|
| Partition period: |
Bar Confederation (1768) Kosciuszko Rebellion (1794) Warsaw Uprising (1794) Vilna Uprising (1794) Courland Uprising (1794) Greater Poland Uprising (1794) Revolt of Denisco (1797) Greater Poland Uprising (1806) Revolt in Galicia (1809) November Uprising (1830) Greater Poland Uprising (1846) Khokhlov uprising (1846) Krakow Uprising (1846) Greater Poland Uprising (1848) January Uprising (1863) Circum-Baikal uprising (1866) Revolution 1905-1907 (1905-1907) Uprising in Lodz (1905) |
 |
| Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth |
Greater Poland Uprising (1918-1919) Olesna uprising (1919) Seinen Uprising (1919) First Silesian Uprising (1919) Second Silesian Uprising (1920) Third Silesian Uprising (1921) Krakow Uprising (1923) Lesko Uprising (1932) |
|
| Occupied Poland |
Chortkiv uprising (1940) Zamoysko Uprising (1941-1944) Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943) Uprising in the Bialystok Ghetto (1943) Action "Storm" (1944) Warsaw Uprising (1944) |
|
| Polish People's Republic |
Poznań June (1956) Gomulka's Thaw (1956) March (1968) December (1970-1971) June (1976) July (1980) Martial law in Poland (1981-1983) April-September (1988) Round Table (1989) | |
The beginning of political transformations. 1956 was a turning point for Poland. Even a relatively tough authoritarian regime could not break Polish political traditions and political identity, which was based on the idea of complete independence of the country and the possibility of choosing its own path of development. A period began that was characterized by alternating tendencies of liberalization and reaction. Gomułka's government carried out a number of reforms: cooperativization became voluntary, most cooperatives were dissolved, land was returned to individual peasants, limited private initiative was allowed in the economy, pressure on the press was eased, workers were given the opportunity to participate in the management of enterprises, and relations with the Catholic Church improved. However, already at the end of the 1950s, resistance from party circles significantly neutralized the results of the reforms. Censorship has again intensified in the country, an anti-religious campaign and a campaign against farms have begun, and industrial self-government has been practically eliminated. In 1968, student protests were suppressed, and Poland took part in the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia. In 1970, the authorities forcibly suppressed labor unrest in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, resulting in casualties (about 70 killed and 1,000 injured). Gomułka was forced to resign. A large number of intellectuals emigrated from Poland.
After the unrest was suppressed, the authorities were again forced to make compromises. The government of Edward Terek normalized relations with the Catholic Church
and placed emphasis on the social component of economic development - housing construction, increasing wages, and the like. At the same time, Gierek sought to modernize Polish industry, strengthening its export component. To finance all these programs, the government borrowed financially from capitalist countries. It was not possible to repay the debts, and in the mid-1970s an economic crisis began in Poland. Social problems in 1976 again led to labor unrest. The arrests of labor opposition activists aroused the indignation of the opposition-minded intelligentsia, who, to protect workers, created the Committee for Public Self-Defense (KOS) in 1978, which became the organizational core of the opposition forces. Of great importance for the growth of nationally-tinged opposition sentiments was the election in 1978 of the Pole Karol Wojtyla, John Paul II, as Pope, who made a triumphal visit to Poland. In 1980, as a result of rising prices for consumer goods, the most massive protests of workers began, who created workers' strike committees and a single Inter-factory Committee, one of the leaders of which was Gdansk shipyard worker Lech Walesa. The committee put forward 22 economic and political demands to the authorities, which included not only higher wages and lower food prices, but also the rights to independent trade unions and strikes. The strikers received support from the opposition intelligentsia from the KOS (reformed into the KOS-Committee for the Protection of Workers - KOS-KOR). The government was forced to enter into a negotiation process with the workers and their consultants, as a result of which most of the opposition's demands were satisfied in August 1980, and in September Terek was replaced by Stanislav Kanya.
Having achieved concessions, the opposition increased pressure on the regime. Workers left state trade unions en masse and joined the independent trade union Solidarity, headed by Walesa. Strikes paralyzed the economy. In September 1981, Solidarity issued a sensational call for workers in Eastern Europe to form free trade unions and fight for freedom. Solidarity demanded the introduction of industrial self-government for workers, and in December raised the question of participation in the elections, thereby threatening the PUWP monopoly on power. A more radical nationalist organization, the Confederation of Independent Poland, opposed the USSR.
On October 12, 1981, the PZPR was headed by Defense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski. On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski introduced martial law in Poland. The leadership of the country passed from civilian authorities to the Military Council of National Salvation. Solidarity leaders were arrested. Poland received loans from the Soviet Union, which allowed for a slight improvement in its economic situation. The situation stabilized for a while. In 1983, martial law was lifted and then a political amnesty was declared. At the same time, Solidarity continued to operate illegally.
The events of 1980-1983 led to the fact that Solidarity refused to cooperate with the authorities - the coexistence of the regime and the opposition became impossible. At the same time, the authorities were unable to achieve the complete elimination of the political rival, fearing nationwide unrest, while the opposition increased its influence.
The only way to solve the problem was to carry out economic reforms that would improve living standards and reduce social tension. However, attempts at reform by the Jaruzelski government in the mid-1980s encountered resistance from its own bureaucracy.
Perestroika in the USSR gave impetus to changes throughout Eastern Europe, including Poland. The economic crisis that erupted in 1988 once again led workers to strike. The government entered into negotiations with Walesa. An agreement was reached to end the strikes in exchange for the legalization of Solidarity and liberalization of the regime. By this time, the leaders of Solidarity had moved from the ideas of “democratic socialism” that they put forward in 1980-1981 to liberalism.
Negotiations in 1989 between representatives of the opposition and the regime were carried out within the framework of the so-called “round table” of political parties and public organizations. The Round Table became the main source of legitimate regime change. Moreover, the round table was intended as a tool for reform, not for eliminating the regime. The negotiation process significantly reduced the potential for conflict between the opposition and the regime, which contributed to a peaceful and, most importantly, relatively legitimate transformation of the political system.
As a result of the agreement reached in April 1989 at the round table of the PUWP, Solidarity, the Catholic Church and other organizations, Solidarity was given the opportunity to take part in limited elections to the Sejm, and Jaruzelski became the president of the PPR. In addition, the Catholic Church gained official status, and the PUWP monopoly in the media began to be overcome. The leadership of the USSR, in the wake of perestroika and warming relations with the USA and NATO, did not interfere with the processes taking place in Poland.
The parliamentary elections on June 4, 1989 ended in the triumph of Solidarity - the Civil Committee it created won in all the districts where elections were held (some seats were reserved for the PUWP and its allies). On August 24, the Democratic and Peasant Parties, previously subordinate to the PUWP, went over to the Solidarity side in the Sejm. This coalition elected the leader of the Catholic Solidarity faction, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as head of government. In July 1990, Mazowiecki removed all communists from the government, and Jaruzelski resigned.